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Abstract 
Do parties still represent their voters’ preferences with regard to distributive policies? Three negative 
answers can be found in the literature: first, parts of welfare state research see distributive policies 
increasingly determined by exogenous constraints (globalization), rather than voter preferences. Second, 
recent research on party system realignment argues that party competition today is structured by cultural, 
rather than economic issues. Third, an even more far-reaching party organization literature questions 
democratic representation altogether, seeing current party politics as purely elite-based and detached from 
voter preferences.  
All three arguments are have been underlined empirically by studies showing that parties have changed 
their positions on economic policies as compared to the post-war past. We argue that such an approach may 
underestimate party-voter congruence since it does not take shifting electoral configurations and shifting 
policy agendas into account, as parties may advocate different policies, because they represent different 
voters with different interests. Hence, voters and parties may still be congruent in their positions, even 
though policy positions have changed. We test our arguments with regard to labor market policy in Austria, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK between the mid-1990s and the late 2000s. We rely on 
a newly compiled data set on party positions in electoral campaigns and compare them to voter preferences 
on the basis of micro-level survey data. Our results show that there still is a reasonable amount of 
congruence with regard to labor market policies, especially in countries with proportional representation. 
We also find evidence that left parties represent their voters’ labor market policy preferences more 
congruently than right parties. Finally and in contrast to widespread assumptions in the recent cleavage 
literature, we find no evidence for a trade-off between congruence on cultural and economic issues: 
countries with a salient cultural conflict perform no different in terms of overall economic congruence than 
countries without. At the same time, however, our results show that right-wing populist parties are 
particularly incongruent with their voters’ preferences regarding labor market policies.  
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1.	  Introduction1	  
Congruence between citizens’ policy preferences and the positions of their elected 
representatives is crucial to democratic quality. In a very fundamental sense, democracy 
and democratic representation are about making citizens’ opinions present in the policy 
process (Pitkin 1967), and the election of political parties is supposed to ensure this link 
between voter preferences, party positions and policy outputs. For a long time, this 
condition seemed largely unproblematic, since “mass parties” precisely mobilized 
specific socio-structural electorates to represent their interests in the democratic process. 
As Peter Mair (1997, 99-100) put it “[Mass parties] were the first parties that explicitly 
claimed to represent the interests of only one segment of society (…) The political party 
was the forum in which the political interest of the social group it represented was 
articulated.” In the specific area of distributive policies, it has long been unquestioned 
that the “democratic class struggle” (Korpi 1983) must be seen as the direct translation of 
class-based distributive interests into the parliamentary arena via elections. The core  
claim of the power resources theory holds that left parties are representatives of the 
working class, and thus advocate generous welfare policies, while right-wing parties try 
to limit these policies to avoid heavy taxation for their middle- and upper-class voters. 
This view corresponds exactly to the idea and concept of the mass party representation. 
And even though the comparative welfare state literature and the party/representation 
literature have developed (and still develop) almost completely separate from each other, 
both converge today regarding their skepticism as to whether this particular link between 
party positions and voters’ distributive preferences is still intact.  
 
In this paper, we address three different strands of literature, which all contend that the 
congruence of voter- and party positions with regard to distributive policies has become 
weak: 1) the “comparative welfare state”-literature: key contributions to recent welfare 
state research dealing with the impact of political parties argue that globalization 
                                                
1 This paper was written in the context of the research program “From Elections to Output: linking party 
system change and distributive policy change” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. The 
authors thank Henning Finseraas, Nathalie Giger, Jane Gingrich, Achim Goerres, Jason Hecht, Robert 
Rohrschneider and A. Maurits van der Veen for their very useful comments on a previous draft of this 
paper. 
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increasingly ties the hands of national parties, detaching their policies from the 
preferences of voters (e.g. Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Huber and Stephens 2001). 2) The 
“realignment”-literature: much of the recent research on party system change claims that 
party competition in today’s Western democracies is structured by cultural issues such as 
immigration, rather than by economic issues, and that the representation of these cultural 
issues blurs the congruence of voter-party positions with regard to social and economic 
policies (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008). 3) Finally, the most radical critique of voter-party 
congruence stems from the literature on “cartel parties”, which sees parties as purely 
elite-based and state-oriented, and democracy as increasingly detached from voter 
preferences altogether (Katz and Mair 1995; Mair 2004).  
We adopt an agnostic position as to whether we expect these critical claims to be 
empirically valid. However, we argue that there is a number of problems with the 
theoretical and empirical foundations on which they are made. These problems stem to a 
large extent from the fact that party system research tends to be blind regarding recent 
changes in what distributive policies are about (which is analyzed extensively in the 
welfare state literature), and that welfare state research tends to be blind regarding 
ongoing dynamics of electoral change (analyzed extensively in the party system 
literature). Therefore, certain studies measure congruence with regard to distributive 
issues that do not reflect the current distributive policy agenda, while other studies 
measure congruence by only looking at parties, but not at the constituencies these parties 
actually mobilize. Hence, our question in this paper is to what extent and under what 
conditions party positions on current labor market policies - articulated during election 
campaigns - are congruent with the policy preferences of their current electoral 
constituencies.  
 
For our analysis, we draw on new data from an ongoing comparative research project that 
compares voter and party positions with regard to different distributive policies in seven 
European countries. In this paper, we analyze voter-party congruence with regard to labor 
market policy in Austria, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK between the 
mid-1990s and the late 2000s. We thereby proceed as follows: In the next part, we review 
the three strands of literature, which claim that policy congruence on the economic-
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distributive dimension is declining. In a third part we present our own argument why 
these assumptions might underestimate congruence and we develop a number of country-
, party- and policy-specific hypotheses regarding the determinants of congruence. A 
fourth section presents our case selection, data and methods. In section five we present 
our findings of our mostly explorative analysis and section six serves as a conclusion. 
 
2.	  Theory:	  has	  voter-­party	  congruence	  on	  distributive	  
policies	  declined?	  	  
The literature on congruence and party responsiveness is broad and rich, so that a few 
terminological clarifications may be helpful to situate our endeavor in these debates. In 
line with Bartels (2008), we distinguish between congruence and responsiveness. 
Responsiveness refers to a dynamic process of interest representation, i.e. parties are 
responsive if they follow shifts in the preferences of their voters and vice versa (Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 1995; 
Wlezien and Soroka 2007). However, as Bartels (2008, 4) argues, policy-makers may be 
responsive at the margin, even though their policies differ strongly from what the public 
wants. Consequently, the literature on policy congruence is interested in the 
correspondence between the preferences and policy-positions of the public and policy-
makers (governmental elites and parties), rather than dynamic shifts. This is what Powell 
(2000) does, focusing on the overall ideological left-right scale. As Bartels (2008), 
however, we prefer to focus on specific policies and policy reform directions, since they 
are more clearly interpretable than the left-right scale. Our approach is therefore also 
related to the concept of “party representation” (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2007; 
Thomassen and Schmitt. 1997), which implies that parties offer policy alternatives and 
that these alternatives are congruent with the preferences of their voters. Finally, and 
most clearly, our paper is in line with a recent contribution by Kitschelt and Rehm 
(2011), who compare the preferences of party constituencies to the positions of parties on 
three different policy-dimensions, and who find ample evidence for congruence. We 
share much of their approach and assumptions, but we measure party positions on the 
basis of statements in the media (during election campaigns) rather than on the basis of 
expert-surveys or manifesto-data, since we want to break the analysis down to a specific 
 5 
policy field in order to grasp positions on the actually salient reform directions.  
 
Most of the current literature argues that the congruence between voters and parties on 
distributive issues is bad, respectively deteriorating. These assertions are mostly made on 
the basis of the empirical observation that parties today advocate and implement 
“unexpected” policies (see e.g. Kitschelt 2001; Kriesi et al. 2008; Pierson 1994, 2001; 
Ross 2000). Social Democrats implementing cutbacks of welfare benefits or – on the 
contrary – right-wing parties defending the current welfare status quo are taken as 
indicators of a declining policy congruence2. Three arguments and possible explanations 
can be distinguished.  
 
The first argument belongs to comparative welfare state research. The very influential 
power resources literature (Esping-Andersen 1985; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979) has 
always relied on the “mass party”-view of voter-party representation. Power resources 
theory has demonstrated that social democratic parties in the post-war era mobilized the 
quickly growing industrial working class and represented their interests in the policy-
making process very effectively. For the power resource theory, welfare politics is a class 
struggle with democratic means. The electoral basis of parties – i.e. workers voting for 
the left and the more privileged strata voting for the right – were and are usually neither 
questioned nor investigated empirically. Hence, when a range of studies in this area 
found declining differences between the positions of parties (such as Huber and Stephens 
2001), this was interpreted as a decline in representational congruence and a decline of 
the importance of political parties. Globalization, increasing fiscal austerity and 
institutional path-dependency are supposed to be the drivers of this decline in congruence 
(Huber and Stephens 2001; Pierson 2001). The underlying idea is that parties would still 
represent the same social groups with the same interests if only they could. However, 
looking at party positions and party policies only to judge interest representation is 
obviously problematic, because it implies that the electoral basis of the political parties 
                                                
2 One may obviously distinguish between what parties advocate (i.e. the policy positions they take in the 
elections) and what they actually implement (i.e. actual government policies). There may be convergence in 
either one of them or both. In this paper, we only compare voter preferences to policy preferences parties 
articulate in election campaigns. In the wider context of the project from which this paper is drawn, we do 
trace the entire representational chain from voter preferences to policy outputs.  
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participating in distributive struggles are more assumed than actually observed 
(Häusermann 2010). In other words, it completely neglects the voter side. Even if parties 
defend policies that differ from what they advocated in the 1960 and 1970s, they can still 
be perfectly congruent with their electorate, since the electorate may have changed, too.  
 
The second strand of literature which argues a radical decline in voter-party congruence 
can be traced back to the “cartel party thesis” developed by Katz and Mair (1995) and 
further elaborated by Mair (2004, 2008) and Blyth and Katz (2005). The key idea in this 
thesis – very much in contrast to the welfare literature – is that the age of “mass parties” 
is over. On the basis of rising abstentionism and electoral volatility, as well as declining 
trust in political institutions among citizens, these authors argue that political parties have 
become almost entirely detached from voters and voter preferences. Instead, parties are 
oriented towards the state for their support, legitimacy and resources. Elections in this 
view do not actually affect or change policies, because parties divide resources and power 
among themselves anyway. The idea that globalization and exogenous constraints narrow 
down the leeway of political parties in distributive politics is very much present in the 
cartel party literature, too, but in contrast to the power-resources view, cartel parties are 
not expected to defend their voters interests even if they could, because their power does 
not depend on voters anymore. This view is certainly the most radical questioning of 
voter-party congruence (the “hollowing of democracy” in Mairs’ words, 2004). It, 
however, shares a major weakness with the welfare state literature, namely the neglect of 
the demand side. The fact that parties advocate positions that differ from their positions 
in the past does not per se mean that they have abandoned their electorate.  
 
The final strand of literature, which argues a decline in voter-party congruence on 
distributive policies deals with a realignment of party competition and party systems over 
the past 30 years. In contrast to the welfare state literature, both the demand- and the 
supply-side are taken into account in this strand of research, which was has mostly been 
developed in works by Kriesi (1998, 1999; Kriesi et al. 2008), Kitschelt (1994; Kitschelt 
and Rehm 2011) and more recent contributions ((Bornschier 2010; Lachat and Dolezal 
2008; Oesch 2008). The argument in this literature bears not on a decline of congruence 
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in general, but on a specific decline of traditional “class voting”, i.e. a decline of 
congruence in distributive politics. These authors argue that since the 1970s, a new 
cultural dimension of party mobilization and conflict (comprising issues such as cultural 
liberalism, immigration or EU integration) has been structuring voter-party links in 
Western Europe. Today, they argue, voters choose parties on the basis of these cultural 
issues, rather than with regard to economic preferences, because economic issues are seen 
as increasingly technical questions that tend to be out of the hands of national 
governments. Given that voters choose parties because of their stances on cultural 
themes, it is assumed that voter-party congruence has shifted to these “salient” issues, 
whereas it declines with regard to economic and welfare policies (Lachat and Dolezal 
2008). Hence, there is an underlying idea of a zero-sum game or a trade-off between 
congruence on cultural vs. economic themes. This is why this literature suggests that a 
rise of cultural politics leads to a decline of congruence on distributive issues. The weak 
point of this literature is mainly twofold: first, there is no logical reason for an overall 
trade-off between congruence on cultural and economic issues, since different 
dimensions of party competition may be salient for different parties. And second, as 
criticized by Bartels (2008), the “economic dimension” tends to be conceptualized and 
measured quite simply - but probably inadequately - as “more spending” or “more 
welfare”. The welfare literature, however, has shown that the agenda of salient 
distributive policies today has shifted to more diverse and specific preferences on 
retrenchment, social investment or redistribution (e.g. Bonoli 2005; Häusermann 2010; 
Häusermann and Kriesi 2011; Levy 1999). Hence, congruence must be assessed with 
regard to these actually salient issues.  
 
3.	  The	  argument:	  new	  voters,	  new	  demands	  	  
All of the critics of current voter-party congruence make plausible arguments as to why it 
might have become more difficult or less of a goal for parties to represent their voters’ 
social and economic policy interests. However, we contend that we might underestimate 
voter-party congruence because electorates and policy issues have changed. The three 
criticisms discussed above tend to neglect these changes, which is why they cannot test 
congruence conclusively.  
 8 
 
Our basic hypothesis is that we still find a reasonable amount of congruence between 
parties and their electorates if we compare voter-party positions on the basis of their 
current electorates and relevant policy-issues. We contend that distributive policy still 
matters to democratic representation, because fiscal austerity has put social and economic 
policies even more strongly on the forefront of the policy agenda. Of course, the 
aforementioned authors do not deny the relevance of distributive policy as such, but they 
argue that it has been subtracted to the national electoral arena, since it is out of the hands 
of governments (Duch and Stevenson 2008). And while this may be true for fiscal and 
monetary policy (Boix 2000) the same cannot be said for social policy. Welfare policies – 
pensions, labor market regulation, health care, family policy, education and training 
systems, and even tax policy – are still in the hands of national governments and huge 
variations in the regulation of these areas and their distributive consequences persist, as 
an ample welfare literature has shown (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001; Häusermann 2010; 
Palier 2010; Pierson 2001; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Also, welfare policies still matter 
for the electoral success of parties (e.g. Armingeon and Giger 2008) and party 
polarization over redistributive issues has not declined since the 1970s (Finseraas and 
Vernby 2011). And while “new”, more culturally connotated issues such as immigration 
or environmental protection have certainly become key to voters’ electoral choice (Kriesi 
et al. 2008), there is in principle no reason for there to be a trade-off between cultural and 
economic policies. Lachat and Dolezal (2008), for instance, show that in Western Europe, 
attitudes on immigration have become equally important to economic attitudes in 
explaining vote choice, and Bartels (2008) similarly shows that while cultural issues have 
increased in electoral saliency, economic-distributive issues have remained equally 
important as in the past. A zero-sum view of issue-congruence depends on the 
assumption that parties necessarily need to present coherent packages of policies, and that 
an increase in the party polarization on one issue dimension necessarily leads to lower 
polarization on the other issue dimension. 
 
Based on the contention that there still is ample room for polarization and congruence on 
distributive policies, we argue that a test of congruence needs to take two developments 
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seriously: the change in voter alignment and the change in policy agendas. With regard to 
electoral changes, we draw on the realignment literature. An ample strand of research has 
been showing over the past 20 years that the socio-structural transformation of Western 
societies goes together with changing patterns of voting behavior (Bornschier 2010; 
Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi 1998; Kriesi et al. 2008; Oesch 
2006). In the wake of post-industrialization, the middle class has become broader and 
more heterogeneous. Kriesi (1998) identifies a new class of “socio-cultural 
professionals”, i.e. (high-)skilled individuals who work in the public sector or in private 
services. This new middle class typically votes on the left, because they share 
universalistic values (Oesch 2006). At the same time, the working class has also become 
divided between a service and a manual working class – or a “new and old” working 
class. Members of the old manual blue-collar working class –  the traditional electorate of 
the left, and the main reason these parties have defended generous and expansive welfare 
policies - increasingly desert the left and cast their vote for the radical and populist right 
(Bornschier 2010; Oesch 2008). The “new” working class on the other hand has no party 
that traditionally mobilizes and represents them and their party choice is thus very much 
undetermined3.  
 
Overall, we do know that both the middle- and the working classes have become split in 
different social classes with their distinct demands and needs, and thus their distinct 
policy and party preferences. Hence, parties may today rely on an electorate that is very 
much different from their traditional constituency. Left parties increasingly represent the 
educated middle classes, whereas the radical right represents workers. If these parties still 
want to be congruent with their voters’ economic interests, they need to change policy 
positions as opposed to the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, a shift to more moderate social 
policies by Social Democrats may not be a sign of declining congruence, but rather a sign 
of adaptation to their new middle-class constituency. This is why we think that we need 
to take both the demand and the supply side of policy preferences into account when 
                                                
3 Little research exists on these workers political preferences. We may link it to Rueda’s (2007) distinction 
of insiders and outsiders with blue-collar workers being the insiders and the service proletariat being the 
outsiders. Rueda assumes that the left represents the insiders while the outsiders turn to the radical right, 
but empirically this is still untested. 
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assessing congruence.  
 
The second change that we need to take into account when assessing congruence is 
change in policy agendas. With the differentiation of the class structure, the needs and 
demands of different social classes have become more specific and more diverse. The 
new working class needs job opportunities in the first place, while the old working class 
relies on social insurance (Häusermann and Schwander 2011; Rueda 2007) . High-skilled 
female service sector workers may demand childcare policies to combine work and 
family, whereas they may refuse subsidies to save jobs in declining industries. Given that 
the context of fiscal austerity (Pierson 2001) has made the stakes higher and distributive 
struggles more acute, different social groups increasingly advocate the expansion of 
benefits for themselves only, not in general. This change and differentiation of social 
policy preferences might therefore translate into party positions that are not aligned on a 
single dimension anymore. Hence, in contrast to times of welfare expansion, the question 
today is not just how much welfare state or redistribution a party or a constituency 
advocates. Rather the policy reform space has become truly multidimensional (Bonoli 
and Natali 2012; Häusermann 2010; Häusermann and Kriesi 2011). Hence, if we only 
test whether voters and parties want “more or less” welfare, we may find a bad 
congruence fit, which however neglects these underlying differentiations. This is why we 
argue that we need to examine voter-party congruence on theoretically and politically 
meaningful dimensions of policy reform.  
 
In the following, we develop a series of hypotheses regarding the determinants of voter-
party congruence, which we derive from the theoretical discussion above, and which will 
structure our empirical analysis. We start (H1) with a general comparison of the voter-
party match to address the claim that there is no linkage between voter- and party-
positions in Western Democracies anymore, and that parties have converged on the same 
policies (Mair 2004). Our goal here is to assess whether we see some (positive) relation 
between voter and party positions and whether parties offer distinct alternatives to the 
electorate, as two necessary conditions for congruence and democratic quality.  
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The other theories discussed above can be traced back to specific explanatory factors, i.e. 
determinants of congruence, and can therefore be tested through comparisons across 
countries, parties and policy issues. At the level of country-specific determinants of 
voter-party congruence, we contrast two hypotheses. The “cultural” realignment theory 
(Kriesi et al. 2008) argues that cultural party competition distracts parties from the 
representation of economic preferences. If this is true, we should see voter-party 
congruence on distributive policies to be lower in those countries where the cultural 
dimension of voter mobilization has become particularly salient (H2). Hence, we can 
compare countries with strong cultural mobilization (articulated in the rise of a right-wing 
populist party) to those countries where the economic dimension of party competition has 
remained the predominant one.   
The second country-specific hypothesis refers to the institutional argument that 
proportional democracies (PR), characterized by multiparty systems (Bernauer, Giger, 
and Rosset 2010; Lijphart 1999; Powell Jr. 2000) have a better representative 
performance than majoritarian democracies (H3), the mechanism being that parties in PR 
systems can “specialize” in the representation of a particular constituency. We may note 
that H2 and H3 are largely contrasting since the cultural conflict dimension has emerged 
more “easily” in PR systems than in majoritarian systems, where the rise of new parties is 
much more difficult.  
 
A second set of hypotheses focuses on characteristics of political parties as determinants 
of voter-party congruence. In line with the realignment-literature, we argued above that 
changing patterns of party preferences have made party electorates and constituencies 
more heterogeneous, which may render the representation of economic interests more 
difficult. Hence, we argue that the more heterogeneous a party’s electorate in socio-
structural terms, the worse its voter-party congruence on distributive policies (H4). This 
hypothesis is similar to Kitschelt and Rehm’s (2011) idea that some parties resemble 
“department stores”, offering different supplies to different groups of voters, whereas 
others are “boutique parties”, which represent a (socially and thematically) limited group 
of voters. Second, on the basis of issue ownership theory (van der Brug 2004) one would 
expect that left parties have a better voter-party congruence regarding distributive 
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policies than right-wing parties (H5). With the rise of new topics such as immigration, 
security and multiculturalism over the past years, the right has increasingly focused on a 
law-and-order approach, whereas the left has more strongly tried to uphold its traditional 
areas of competence, which clearly are in economic and social policy. Hence, given that 
the left is more clearly elected precisely for these topics, one would expect congruence to 
be higher.  
 
Finally, one may also expect congruence to differ depending on the issue at stake. In line 
with Piersons’ (1994, 2001) very influential work on austerity and retrenchment, it can be 
hypothesized that congruence is lower with regard to social policy retrenchment than 
with regard to expansive policies (H6). Indeed, Pierson has strongly argued that voters 
across classes and across the political spectrum are likely to reject retrenchment. Parties, 
on the other hand, are likely to have somewhat more polarized positions for or against 
retrenchment, based on their programmatic orientation and/or external constraints. 
Following this argument, we may expect a disconnection between voters and parties 
regarding retrenchment. Alternatively, parties might not advocate retrenchment in the 
electoral campaign either, out of the fear of electoral blame, in which case we would have 
weak congruence because we have weak variation among both parties and voters. 
Expansive policies, by contrast, are electorally more attractive, as credit-claiming policies 
for both voters and parties, which is why they are supposed to be more relevant for 
electoral party competition and thus more important for voter-party congruence. Table 1 
summarizes the hypotheses. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Theoretical foundation 
Unit of 
analysis 
H1: Parties today are detached from their 
voters and converge on distributive policies 
Cartel party thesis (Katz 
and Mair 1995; Mair 
2004) 
Political 
parties 
H2: The more relevant voter mobilization 
on the cultural dimension, the worse voter-
party congruence w/r to distributive 
policies (trade-off) 
“Cultural” realignment 
theory (Kriesi et al. 
2008) 
Country 
H3: Proportional representation leads to 
better voter-party congruence 
Institutionalism: PR vs. 
Majoritarian (Bernauer, 
Giger, and Rosset 2010; 
Lijphart 1999) 
Country 
H4: the more heterogeneous a party’s 
electorate, the worse its voter-party 
congruence 
Realignment theory 
(Kitschelt and Rehm 
2011) 
Political 
parties 
H5: Left parties have a better voter-party 
congruence w/r to distributive policies than 
right-wing parties. 
Issue-competence (van 
der Brug 2004) 
Party 
families (left 
vs. right) 
H6: Voter-party congruence is lower with 
regard to retrenchment policies than with 
regard to expansive policies 
New Politics of the 
Welfare State (Pierson 
2001) 
Policy 
reform 
direction 
  
4.	  Case	  selection,	  data	  and	  methods	  
In order to analyze the voter-party congruence across different countries, party systems 
and parties, we study five Western European countries: Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. This case selection enables us to compare 
majoritarian systems (UK) to PR systems (A, Ger, NL, CH), as well as party systems 
with important parties on the radical left (Ger: Die Linke; NL: SP) and on the radical 
right (CH: SVP; A: FPÖ; NL: LPF, PVV). We also limit our analysis to labor market 
policy, i.e. all distributive policies that deal with employment performance, 
unemployment benefits and employability of individuals. We choose labor market policy 
because it is one of the key problems of Western democracies and because it has clear 
distributive implications. 
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Data and coding 
For our analysis of party positions, we code information from national legislative 
elections4, because elections are crucial in the voter-party-link (Mair 2008) and thus for 
voter-party-congruence. Following the work by Kriesi et al. (2006, 930), we consider 
“political debates during election campaigns, as reflected by the mass media” as an 
appropriate way to catch a party’s position. Rather than relying on party manifestos (as 
used in Kim and Fording 1998, 2002, 2003) or expert surveys (as used in Huber and 
Powell 1994; Kitschelt and Rehm 2011; Powell Jr. 2000). This focus enables us to 
simultaneously (1) include the most hotly debated issues during the election campaign, 
(2) grasp the positions of a party as it is seen in the public and (3) measure the saliency 
and the position of a party regarding specific issues. We believe that this gives us a more 
‘realistic’ (read: as seen in the wider public) party position than alternative approaches. 
The disadvantage of our approach is that we have to rely on newly collected data. We 
applied newspaper content analysis to identify the positions of political parties in the 
media. For the selection of the time periods, newspapers and newspaper articles we 
followed the work by Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008), i.e. we chose for each country a quality 
newspaper and a tabloid5 and analyzed their articles two month prior to the national 
elections. We coded all articles containing statements of political parties on labor market 
policy. Each article was coded in a two-step-procedure. In the first step, articles were 
analyzed sentence by sentence. If a sentence contained information on the relationship 
between a political party and some issue on labor market policy6, the sentence was copied 
into a data file together with additional information such as the date and the newspaper 
name7. In a second step these statements were coded regarding their policy direction. A 
statement could express a party’s position in favor of one or several of four possible 
                                                
4 The national elections are: Austria 1999, and 2006;  Germany 1998, 2002, and 2005; Netherlands 
2002/2003, and 2006; Switzerland1995, 1999, and 2007;UK 1997, 2001, and 2005. We had to exclude the 
mid-1990 elections in the Netherlands and Austria because there is no micro-level data on the voter 
preferences for this time point in the ISSP surveys. 
5 The newspapers are: Austria: Die Presse, Kronenzeitung; Germany: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Bild; 
Netherlands: Algemeen Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad; Switzerland: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Blick; UK: The 
Times, The Sun. 
6 Statements related to industrial relations have not been included. 
7 Following this procedure we gathered the following number of statements for each election: Austria 273 
(for the 1999 election), 132 (2006); Germany: 267 (1998), 234 (2002), 422 (2005); Netherlands: 87 
(2002/3), 201 (2006); Switzerland: 336 (1995), 205 (1999), 542 (2007); UK: 288 (1997), 120 (2001), 241 
(2005). 
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reform directions: redistribution, retrenchment, social investment (i.e. public action to 
enhance employability and job opportunities) or status quo. For each direction, the party 
received a value of 1 if the statement supported this reform direction, and 0 otherwise. 
This allowed us to calculate the mean support of a party for a particular reform direction 
per election year. If all of a party’s statements favored redistribution, it would receive a 
value of 1. Since statements can refer to several directions simultaneously, all four 
positions can range from 0 to 1.  
 
Regarding the micro-level data, i.e. the position of voters, we rely on the International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP) data from the Role of Government 1996 and 2006 surveys, 
since they contain the most detailed information on specific labor market policy reform 
preferences. We use the 1996 data to analyze congruence in the first election of the mid-
1990s and 2006-data to analyze congruence in the last election of each country. 
Regarding the election in between these two, we use the average of constituency 
preferences. Austria is not included in the ISSP, which is why we use data from the 
Sozialer Survey Österreich (SSÖ) 2003 for the last and middle election. The Netherlands 
are lacking in the ISSP 1996, which is why we use the 2006-data for the last and the 
middle election. From the specific questions in these surveys, we calculated the 
preferences of each individual regarding redistribution, retrenchment, social investment 
and status quo on a scale from 0 to 1. This allows us to compute the mean position of all 
party electorates regarding all four reform directions. Hence, for each party electorate, we 
have four positions per election. The precise operationalization of voter preferences is 
explained in appendix 1.  
 
Methods 
While these two datasets (survey-data and coded party positions) offer us rather detailed 
and sophisticated measures of parties’ and voters’ positions on labor market policies, the 
challenge is to combine them in a meaningful way since they are not and cannot be 
measured on the exact same scale. In the literature on voter-party congruence and party 
responsiveness, several approaches have been used depending on the chosen 
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measurement of party positions8. We opt for an approach similar to the one by 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2007) and Kitschelt and Rehm (2011), i.e. we use 
correlations to measure the congruence of voters and parties. By doing so, we follow 
Bornschier (2010, 81) who argues that “[i]t is possible to measure the congruence of 
representation … by calculating correlations. The differing scales are not a problem in 
correlations, because the latter tap only the covariance between positions”, this means 
that we only interpret relative positions, rather than absolute values, which makes sense 
given the fact that we cannot measure voter and party positions on the exact same scale. 
 
5.	  Empirical	  analysis:	  matching	  voter	  and	  party	  positions	  
on	  labor	  market	  policy	  
We start our empirical overview with a general assessment of voter-party congruence 
across all countries and elections. Figure 1 correlates the mean position of party 
electorates (x-axis) with the mean position of parties (y-axis) on all observed issues on 
each of the four possible policy directions.9 Values can range between 0 and 1, 0 meaning 
that a party has not advocated a policy reform direction in any of its statements and that 
none of a party’s voter advocates this policy reform, whereas 1 means that a party has 
claimed a certain policy reform in all of its statements and that all of a party’s voters 
support this policy reform direction. We have a total of 244 observations (3 (UK, CH, 
Ger) or 2 (NL, A) elections, 24 parties and four policy reform directions). We do not 
label the data points here, since figure 1 is only supposed to give an overview of the 
general trend. Two observations are important with regard to figure 1. First, there is a 
positive correlation between voter and party mean positions, meaning that the more a 
party electorate is favorable to retrenchment, redistribution, social investment or status 
quo, the more the corresponding party is favorable to that policy direction, too. Overall, 
                                                
8 Bartels (2008), for example, uses frequency distribution to track down the degree of voter preferences and 
their perceived fulfillment. Soroka and Wlezien (2010) focus on shifts in voter preferences and shifts in 
actual policies (mostly spending levels) to test their thermostat-theory. Kitschelt and Rehm (2011) regress 
voter preferences measured by ISSP-data on party positions measured by expert surveys to analyze the 
congruence. Finally, Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2007) correlate average party constituency preferences 
with expert survey data on party positions. 
9 Party mean position denotes the percentage of party statements that advocated a particular policy reform 
direction. Voter mean position denotes the percentage of party voters who favor that particular policy 
reform direction (operationalized as described in appendix 1). 
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we see that the correlation of 0.34 - which is significant at the 0.01 level – indicates that 
voter-party congruence in labor market policy has not entirely disappeared, as the cartel 
party thesis might have suggested.  
 
Figure 1: Voter-Party Congruence (all countries) 
 
The second observation in Figure 1 that we would like to point out is that the spread of 
voter positions is only slightly smaller than the spread of party positions. Mean positions 
of voters vary between 0.2 and 0.9 and mean positions of parties vary between 0 and 1. 
This is important with regard to the presence of policy alternatives as a precondition for 
representation and democratic quality, since it shows that positions of parties are equally 
diverse as positions of the party constituencies. We have assessed the presence of policy 
alternatives in a second way, displayed in table 2 below. For this table, we have paired all 
parties of a country with all possible other parties for each election period. We have then 
calculated the differences in their positions regarding each of the four policy directions 
and we have (by means of a two-sample test of proportion) tested if these differences are 
significant. Table 2 displays the percentage of significantly different party positions. The 
higher the percentage, the more policy alternatives are present by political parties within 
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a country.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of alternative party-positions by country 
Country 
All parties:  
% of pairwise comparisons that are 
significantly different  
Only across left-right: 
% of pairwise comparisons across the 
left-right blocks that are significantly 
different 
Austria 42 44 
Switzerland 54 59 
Netherlands 47 64 
Germany 51 63 
UK 64 58 
The pairwise comparisons have been calculated for each election and then added up per country. Chosen 
level of significance: 0.1. 
 
As can be seen, differences between countries are considerable. Only in the Netherlands 
and in Austria are less than 50% of all pairwise comparisons significantly different. 
However, a high percentage of similar positions is not very surprising for the first , left-
hand column, since it includes all party comparisons, i.e. also between e.g. social 
democrats and greens, which obviously are not expected to differ that much. 
Consequently, in the second column on the right hand side, we only show the 
comparisons between countries of the left and the right. The across-the block comparison 
only leaves Austria with less than 50% of significantly different pairs. All other countries 
show considerably higher level: around 60% of all pairwise comparisons are significantly 
different, which gives evidence for the fact that these party systems indeed present voters 
with alternative policy positions to choose from.  
 
Country-specific determinants of policy congruence  
We want to assess two theories on voter-party congruence at the country level. The 
“cultural realignment hypothesis” argues that congruence should be lower in those 
countries where cultural party mobilization has become very salient. They suggest a zero-
sum game between economic and cultural voter congruence. When testing this 
hypothesis, we take the existence of a right-wing populist party as a proxy for the 
 19 
saliency of the cultural conflict dimension. Indeed, these parties clearly and 
predominantly mobilize their voters with regard to cultural issues such as immigration 
and traditionalist values (Bornschier 2010). Obviously, it may still be that cultural 
traditionalism is strong in a country without right-wing populist party, because such a 
party did not emerge for structural or institutional reasons (Bornschier 2012). However, 
this is not a problem for our analysis, since the argument that we test holds that once such 
a party exists, it will distract parties and voters from economic and distributive politics. 
Consequently, we should see congruence being weaker in Switzerland, Austria, and the 
Netherlands (after 2002) which all have strong right-wing populist parties (the SVP in 
Switzerland, the FPÖ/BZÖ in Austria and the LPF and PVV in the Netherlands) than in 
the UK and Germany. Figure 2 shows the same information as we have seen in Figure 1, 
but split for countries with and without salient cultural mobilization. Contrary to the 
expectations of the cultural realignment literature, voter-party congruence on labor 
market policy is about the same in both sets of countries. This finding shows that cultural 
mobilization does not automatically and necessarily disrupt the overall voter-party 
congruence on distributive policies. We have discussed this literature skeptically above, 
since we argued that there is no logical reason for there to be a trade-off between cultural 
and distributive congruence, and indeed we do not find evidence for such a trade-off.
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Figure 2: Voter-Party Congruence and saliency of cultural voter mobilization 
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In contrast, our second country-specific hypothesis (H3) receives some empirical support. 
H3 argues that PR electoral systems should lead to higher congruence of voter and party 
positions compared to majoritarian electoral system, since in PR systems, different 
parties represent more specific social segments. This is indeed what we find in Figure 3 
when we compare congruence in PR-countries (A, Ger, NL and CH) with the UK as a 
majoritarian democracy with elections in single-member districts (SMD). While the PR-
countries show a significant positive relationship between voter and party position, the 
weaker but still positive correlation in the UK remains insignificant. Of course, we have 
far less observations to base our results on regarding majoritarian countries as opposed to 
PR countries, and this obviously affects significance levels. However, the small number 
of parties in the case of UK alone does not explain the weak result. Analyses with even 
less observation points do show significant patterns of congruence (as, for example, in 
figure A1 in the appendix, where we compare certain social democratic parties only). 
 
Figure 3: Voter-Party Congruence and electoral regimes 
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The argument on an effect of electoral institutions on congruence is based on the idea of 
constituency-representation, namely that parties in SMD-systems need to gather large 
masses of voters and these heterogeneous voters can then only rarely be adequately 
represented with a single policy position. For parties in PR-systems, however, 
representation should be better since they mobilize a smaller (read: more homogenous) 
constituency (see e.g. Bernauer et al. (2010) for the discussion of this argument). We turn 
next to the question if homogeneous constituencies indeed enhance the voter-party-
congruence. 
 
Party-specific determinants of policy congruence  
H4 argues that the more heterogeneous a party’s electorate, the worse its voter-party 
congruence on labor market policy. Its aim is to assess the realignment theory at the level 
of party electorates. Therefore, we have calculated the degree of socio-structural 
heterogeneity of party electorates on the basis of an 8-class scheme (Oesch 2006) that 
precisely differentiates the new and old working classes and the split within the middle 
class that we have discussed above. Table A3 in the appendix gives the values of 
constituency heterogeneity that we obtained by applying the Herfindahl-index in terms of 
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these 8 classes to each party. Heterogeneity can vary from a minimum of 1 (only 
members of 1 class vote for that party) to a maximum of 8 (all classes are represented 
proportionally to their share in the overall population). We can then correlate this index 
of constituency fractionalization to the value of voter-party congruence for each party, 
which corresponds to the correlation coefficient of voter-party positions on the four 
policy reform directions. The higher this value, the more closely this party matches its 
voters’ positions on redistribution, status quo, social investment and retrenchment of 
labor market policy. Figure 4 shows immediately that the socio-structural 
fractionalization of party electorates as measured here is not closely related to party’s 
congruence with their voters.  
 
 
Figure 4: Voter-party congruence and heterogeneity of party constituencies 
 
 
Even though the correlation coefficient is negative (as expected), the scatter is way too 
loose to show any significant correlation. While this disconfirms our hypotheses, we must 
keep in mind that it might be related to the way in which we measure heterogeneity here, 
namely with regard to 8 occupational classes. Other class-schemes or more reduced 
conceptualizations of groups may represent distributive interest heterogeneity more 
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accurately and we will probe deeper into this as we advance in this project.  
 
Based on the issue-ownership theory, we derived hypothesis 5, which suggests that 
(radical) right parties have a lower degree of party-voter congruence than left-wing 
parties when it comes to distributive policies. Figure 5 thus shows the correlation 
between voter and party positions for left-parties and for right-wing parties separately. It 
also shows three correlation coefficients: the first refers to the overall correlation of all 
left- resp. right-wing parties, whereas the second and third coefficients refer to the 
congruence of moderate vs. radical right and left parties. Two results are particularly 
important: first, as expected, the congruence is stronger for left- than for right-wing 
parties. For all left-wing parties, the correlation between voter- and party-positions is 
highly significant at 0.43. Especially intriguing, but outside of the narrow focus of our 
hypothesis, is the result that the congruence of social democratic parties in Austria, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands seems somewhat better than the congruence of the 
German and British Social Democrats (see figure A1 in the appendix). Both the German 
and the British Social Democrats have undergone a process of transformation from the 
1990s onwards, sharing for at least a decade an explicitly more liberal, third way 
approach, which was supposed to move the distributive policies of the social democrats 
more towards the center and middle classes. It seems like this strategy did not reflect their 
voters’ preferences, whereas the Austrian, Swiss and Dutch Social Democrats remained 
closer to their constituencies with their more traditional left-wing profile. The second 
important result is that the lower congruence found on the right is first and foremost due 
to the radical right-wing parties. They even display a negative correlation (though not 
significant). We interpret this as strong support for the issue ownership thesis: the left 
parties, whose core issues include labor market policies, have a much better congruence 
on these issues than the radical right-wing parties which mobilize their voters based on 
cultural issues such as immigration. Partly, this also provides evidence for the cultural 
realignment theory in the sense that the radical right indeed has low distributive 
congruence. But overall, this does not lower the congruence with regard to distributive 
policies, since the left and even the moderate right continue to represent their voters’ 
interests in terms of labor market policy relatively well. This finding is consistent with 
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evidence showing that while the radical right mobilizes culturally, voters cast their ballot 
for the moderate left and right out of economic concerns (Häusermann and Kriesi 2011). 
 
Figure 5: Voter-Party Congruence : left vs. right-wing parties 
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Policy-specific policy congruence 
So far, all empirical analyses have included the four policy reform directions 
(retrenchment, redistribution, social investment and status quo) as different but equally 
important aspects of labor market policy.  Our 6th and final hypothesis relies on the 
argument that parties have particular difficulties or advantages in representing expansive 
vs. restrictive policy reform directions. Pierson’s (2001) work suggests that we should 
expect stronger levels of congruence regarding expansive reforms than with regard to 
retrenchment: while expansion is a key part of electoral credit-claiming, retrenchment is 
supposed to be particularly unpopular among voters and particularly problematic (for the 
risk of electoral blame) for political parties. Hence, positions on retrenchment might 
either not vary much, or be purely opportunistic on the part of parties. Consequently, 
while we would expect congruence regarding redistribution and social investment 
(expansion), we expect to find little congruence regarding retrenchment.  
Figure 6 shows voter-party convergence for each of the policy reform directions and it 
also differentiates congruence according to radical and moderate parties. In line with 
Pierson’s argument, we find that expansion (redistribution and social investment) is much 
more popular with voters than retrenchment, and the variance of voter positions is lower 
with regard to retrenchment than with regard to expansion. However, contrary to what we 
would expect based on Pierson’s new politics approach, parties are equally polarized with 
regard to both reform directions and they advocate both to similar extents. The pattern we 
find is that in absolute terms, voters are keener on redistribution and social investment 
than parties, whereas parties are on average more favorable to retrenchment than voters. 
However, congruence is equally positive and significant in all three cases. Contrary to 
what one would expect given the theory, it is even strongest with regard to retrenchment. 
Again, moderate parties perform better in terms of congruence than radical parties. What 
figure 6 also shows is that there is very little variance regarding voters’ or parties’ 
positions in favor of defending the policy status quo. We initially interpreted this policy 
direction in the sense of welfare protectionism, but due to the fact that the status quo can 
be both an anti-retrenchment or an anti-expansion position, it is difficult to interpret it 
substantially, which explains both the low variation of positions and low congruence.   
 27 
Figure 6: Voter-Party Congruence: different labor market policy reform directions 
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6.	  Conclusion	  	  
Several different, unrelated strands of recent political science literature are arguing that 
the voter-party congruence on distributive policies has declined in Western Europe. Our 
goal in this paper was to start an empirical exploration of the arguments underlying this 
hypothesis. Different authors contend that parties deviate increasingly from what their 
voters want in terms of economic and social policies, because their hands are tied by 
exogenous forces (such as „globalization“), because their source of power and legitimacy 
has become detached from elections and voters (the „cartel party thesis“) or because 
parties and voters today care about cultural, rather than distributive policies (the „cultural 
realignment thesis“). In opposition to these three claims, we have argued that voter-party 
congruence might persist, because distributive policies are persistently salient to the 
public and the democratic process. We also claimed that parties might still be congruent 
with their voters, even though these voters – and hence their economic interests – have 
changed. Congruence today may actually require parties to advocate different policies 
than they claimed in the past.   
We based our analysis on newly collected data regarding labor market policy in five West 
European countries, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Labor 
market policies are highly salient in the public debate. Also, they are really in the hands 
of national governments, so that congruence is a matter of the parties’ choices, not 
institutional constraints (pension policies, e.g. are much more path-dependent and thus 
allow for less variable party positions). To assess congruence, we mostly correlated the 
mean positions of party electorates (based on survey data) and average party positions 
(based on coded newspaper data).  
 
In conclusion of this paper, we would like to stress three findings. First, left-wing parties 
are more congruent with their voters regarding labor market policies than right-wing 
parties. This difference is rather clear when we compare all left-wing parties to all right-
wing parties. When we differentiate between moderate and radical parties on both the left 
and the right, it appears that both radical and moderate left parties are clearly congruent 
with their voters, while on the right, the radical parties advocate policy reforms that are 
completely unrelated to their voters’ position. The moderate right-wing parties, by 
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contrast, are also congruent with their voters. We interpret this finding as evidence for the 
issue ownership thesis, which holds that parties to a certain extent “own” particular 
political topics that are key to their mobilization and to what voters expect from them and 
trust them to do. For the electoral success of moderate and radical left parties, distributive 
policies have always been key and they seem to remain important. Hence, the argument 
that parties have moved away from their voters and converged on neo-liberal policies 
because of exogenous constraints such as globalization does not seem to hold.  
 
The second main finding is actually a non-finding. Contrary to what the “cultural 
realignment thesis” would hold, we do not find a trade-off between cultural and economic 
voter mobilization. Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands have all seen the emergence 
of powerful populist right-wing parties (the SVP, FPÖ, LPF/PVV), which have massively 
shifted the political debates in these countries towards cultural issues such as immigration 
or cultural liberalism (Kriesi et al. 2008). All parties in these countries need to deal with 
these topics, even if only in a reactive way. One might expect that this focus on the key 
topics of the new right has distracted attention from distributive policies altogether, so 
that congruence between voters and parties on these economic issues would be 
particularly weak. This is, however, not what we find. Overall congruence in Austria 
Switzerland, and the Netherlands is equally strong as in Germany and UK, two countries 
where the populist right has not managed to enter the electoral debates on an important 
scale. Hence, there does not seem to be a general trade-off between economic or cultural 
congruence. Quite the opposite, further analyses of congruence regarding specific party 
families has shown that the Social Democrats in those countries with a strong populist 
right (Austria, Switzerland, and the Netherlands) are very much in line with their voters, 
and somewhat more so than the Social Democrats that have not been challenged by new 
right-wing competitors who try to steal their working class electorate (in Germany and 
the UK, see figures A1 in the appendix). To us, this seems a particularly intriguing 
finding, since it may mean that where the electoral competition for worker’s votes is 
more acute (i.e. where Social democrats face right-wing rivals), the left is pushed to 
represent their voters economic interests more clearly so than in contexts, where the left 
seems unchallenged and thus has the leeway to move to the center (as in the UK and 
 30 
Germany under the “third way” experiment). In this sense, the emergence of a culturally 
based workerist right (the populist right) may not weaken voter-party congruence on 
distributive issues overall, but even strengthen it on the left side of the political spectrum.  
 
Finally, a third finding seems important to us, since it calls for further investigation. We 
have hypothesized that voter-party congruence may be weak if a party’s electorate is very 
heterogeneous socio-structurally. However, we have not found evidence for a link 
between the heterogeneity and congruence.10 There are relatively homogenous parties 
(such as the Austrian FPÖ) which represent their voters labor market policy positions 
very poorly, and there are parties with a very heterogeneous electorate (such as the Swiss 
Social Democrats) who still have a very good fit. While the first deviation from a linear 
correlation might be explained – see above – with the specific non-economic issue-profile 
of right-wing populists, the second is more difficult to understand. How does a party 
manage to be congruent with its electorate if the latter is composed by very different 
social groups, with very different economic needs and demands? In line with earlier work 
of the power resource literature (Esping-Andersen 1985; Korpi 1983) it might be that 
these parties are particularly successful in fostering a policy program that speaks to 
several groups of voters, so that they actually foster homogeneity themselves. But this 
requires further research, especially a test of a variety of conceptualizations and 
measurements of heterogeneity. Overall, we think that our paper has shown that 
congruence between parties and voters on distributive policies has not disappeared, but it 
varies across countries and parties according to patterns that can be explained by existing 
theories. 
 
 
                                                
10 However, we do find evidence that parties in PR-system have a better voter-party-congruence than 
parties in MA-systems. But as shown by our non-finding on the heterogeneity of constituencies, the causal 
link cannot be from electoral system, to more homogenous parties to better representation. An alternative 
explanation – and in line with our finding on the impact of cultural cleavage-mobilization – might be that 
our PR-system-countries tend to be countries where the radical right has surged. This in effect might cause 
social democratic parties to foster voter-party-congruence on labor market issues and thereby improve the 
overall voter-party-congruence within a country.  
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Appendix	  
 
Table A1 List of variables 
VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION 
Redistribution (UK, GER, 
SWI) 
ISSP Role of Government 2006. 
Redistribution is the mean of the following three 
dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that the 
government should spend more money on unemployment 
benefits (V23), 2) that it is the government responsibility 
to provide a decent living standard for the unemployed 
(V30) and 3) that it is the government’s responsibility to 
reduce income differences (V31). 
Redistribution (A) 
Sozialer Survey Österreich 2003 
Redistribution is the mean of the following two 
dichotomous variables: 1) that it is the government 
responsibility to provide a decent living standard for the 
unemployed (f91f03) and 2) that it is the government’s 
responsibility to reduce income differences (f91g03). 
Social investment (UK, 
GER, SWI) 
ISSP Role of Government 2006. 
Social investment is the mean of the following four 
dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that the 
government should finance projects to create new jobs 
(V12), 2) that the working week should be reduced to 
create more jobs (V16), 3) that it is the governments’ 
responsibility to provide a job to everyone who wants one 
(V25) and 4) that it is the governments’ responsibility to 
provide financial help to students from low-income 
families (V32). 
Social investment (A) 
Sozialer Survey Österreich 2003 
Social investment is the mean of the following four 
dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that it is 
the governments’ responsibility to provide a job to 
everyone who wants one (f91a03) and 2) that it is the 
governments’ responsibility to provide financial help to 
students from low-income families (f91h03). 
Retrenchment (UK, GER, 
SWI) 
ISSP Role of Government 2006. 
Retrenchment is the mean of the following four 
dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that there 
should be cuts in government spending (V11), 2) that the 
government should spend less money on unemployment 
benefits (V23), 3) that it is not the government’s 
responsibility to provide a decent living standard for the 
unemployed (V30) and 4) that it is not the governments 
responsibility to reduce income differences (V31).  
Retrenchment (A) 
Sozialer Survey Österreich 2003 
Retrenchment is the mean of the following three 
dichotomous variables: the respondent thinks 1) that there 
should be cuts in government spending (f95b03), 2) that it 
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is not the government’s responsibility to provide a decent 
living standard for the unemployed (f91f03) and 3) that it 
is not the governments responsibility to reduce income 
differences (f91g03). 
Status quo (UK, GER, SWI) 
ISSP Role of Government 2006. 
Status quo is the mean of the following five dichotomous 
variables: the respondent thinks 1) that the government 
should spend neither more nor less on unemployment 
benefits (V23), 2) that the government should support 
declining industries to protect jobs (V15), 3) that the 
government should make no cuts in government spending 
(V11), 4) that it rather is the government’s responsibility 
to provide a decent living standard for the unemployed 
(V30), and 5) that it rather is the government’s 
responsibility to reduce income differences (V31). 
Status quo (A) 
Sozialer Survey Österreich 2003 
Status quo is the mean of the following three dichotomous 
variables: the respondent thinks 1) that the government 
should make no cuts in government spending (f95b03), 2) 
that it rather is the government’s responsibility to provide 
a decent living standard for the unemployed (f91f03), and 
3) that it rather is the government’s responsibility to 
reduce income differences (f91g03). 
UKparty 
ISSP Role of Government 2006 
GB_PRTY (“Which party do you feel close to””; if 
respondent does not feel close to any party, then “Which 
party would you vote for next Sunday?”) 
GERparty 
ISSP Role of Government 2006 
DE_PRTY (“Which party would you vote for next 
Sunday?”) 
CHparty 
ISSP Role of Government 2006 
CH_PRTY (“Which party do you feel close to?”) 
Aparty 
Sozialer Survey Österreich 2003 
H13103 (“Which party do you feel close to?”) 
Party system 
fractionalization 
Index of electoral fractionalization of the party-system 
according to the formula 
[F] proposed by Rae (1968). Values from Argmingeon et 
al. (2010). 
Effective number of parties 
Effective number of parties on the votes level according to 
the formula [N2] proposed 
by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Values from Armingeon 
et al. (2010) 
Heterogeneity in party 
constituency 
Herfindahl-Index:  
Value Party A = 1 / (∑si²) 
 where s = share of class i on party A’s constituency 
calculated from ISSP 2006 and SSÖ 2003 data. 
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Table A2: List of Political Parties 
Party Label Party Name Country Moderate/Radical 
cda Christian Democratic Appeal Netherlands moderate  
cdu Christian Democratic Union Germany moderate  
cons Conservative Party UK moderate 
cvp Christian Democrats Switzerland moderate 
d66 Democrats 66 Netherlands moderate 
evp Protestant People’s Party Switzerland moderate 
fdpCH Radical Democrats Switzerland moderate 
fdpD Free Democrats Germany moderate 
fpo Freedom Party Austria radical 
gl GreenLeft Netherlands moderate 
greenA Greens Austria moderate 
greenCH Greens Switzerland moderate 
greenD Greens Germany moderate 
lab Labor Party UK moderate 
lib Liberal Democrats UK moderate 
linke Radical Left Germany radical 
ovp People’s Party Austria moderate 
pvda Labour Party Netherlands moderate 
sp Socialist Party Netherlands radical 
spd Social Democrats Germany moderate 
spo Social Democrats Austria moderate 
sps Social Democrats Switzerland moderate 
svp Swiss People’s Party Switzerland radical 
vvd People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy Netherlands moderate 
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Figure A1: Voter-Party Congruence: new and old social democracy 
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Table A3: Heterogeneity in Party Constituency 
Party Heterogeneity (Herfindahl-Index) 
 1st period 2nd period 3rd period 
cda (NL) . 5.71 5.71 
cdu (Ger) 5.97 6.30 6.62 
cons (UK) . 6.29 6.29 
cvp (CH) 6.50 6.69 6.88 
d66 (NL) . 4.76 4.76 
evp (CH) 3.57 4.04 4.50 
fdpCH (CH) 6.49 5.91 5.33 
fdpD (Ger) 7.00 6.71 6.41 
fpo (A) . 4.2 4.2 
gl (NL) . 5.22 5.22 
greenA (A) . 4.5 4.5 
greenCH (CH) 6.61 6.24 5.87 
greenD (Ger) 6.34 6.35 6.35 
lab (UK) . 5.91 5.91 
lib (UK) . 6.87 6.87 
linke (Ger) 6.06 5.19 4.31 
ovp (A) . 4.80 4.80 
pvda (NL) . 6.10 6.10 
sp (NL) . 6.01 6.01 
spd (Ger) 5.09 5.25 5.41 
spo (A) . 4.2 4.2 
sps (CH) 5.99 6.05 6.10 
svp (CH) 6.65 6.41 6.16 
vvd (NL) . 5.27 5.27 
Calculation are based on the ISSP-data from 1996 and 2006, using the 8-class-scheme by (Oesch 2006). 
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